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Continued Elite Support for the Norwegian  
Version of the Nordic Model? 
Trygve Gulbrandsen ∗ 
Abstract: »Durchgängige Unterstützung der Elite für die norwegische Version 
des nordischen Modells?«. In contrast to many other Western countries the 
Nordic countries, including Norway, have managed to uphold fairly high levels 
of employment and welfare states offering the citizens universal and relatively 
generous economic benefits. Moreover, the Nordic countries have industrial 
relations characterized by close cooperation between the main partners in the 
labor market. To a large extent the Norwegian version of the Nordic welfare 
state model rests on historical elite compromises forged between leaders of 
various class and interest organizations or movements. In general, there is (still) 
considerable support for the Norwegian welfare state model among the Nor-
wegian elites. This is manifested by a widespread backing of more or at least 
the same level of spending on various important welfare programs. Such sup-
port is also demonstrated by an extensive endorsement of the collaborative 
system of industrial relations. The stability of the Norwegian version of the 
Nordic model is a result of a specific combination of facilitating conditions: A 
strong labor movement, a unique system of wage determination, institutional 
complementarity between this system and welfare state services and benefits, 
an influential profession of economists, a historically uncorrupt and efficient 
civil service, a strong rural counter-culture, and widespread egalitarian values. 
Keywords: Welfare state, Nordic countries, Norway, elite compromises. 
1.   Introduction 
In the last decade, Western societies have been confronted with several serious 
challenges. The international financial crisis that started in 2008 caused severe 
problems in several national economies, increasing unemployment, shrinking 
welfare budgets and national debt. Many observers and scholars alike have 
blamed national elites for allowing the financial crisis to unfold or given them 
outright responsibility for having caused it. In several countries elites have also 
been blamed for increasing socioeconomic inequalities, which have given rise 
to widespread anger in the population. Trust in political institutions has de-
creased or even plummeted in several countries, another indication of increas-
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ing distance between elites and ordinary citizens (Klingemann and Hoffmann-
Lange 2018, in this issue).  
Against this background, Norway and the Nordic countries Denmark, Fin-
land, and Sweden have received much attention for having been able to ward 
off several of the challenges facing other countries. The Nordic countries have 
managed to uphold fairly high levels of employment and welfare states offering 
the citizens universal and relatively generous economic benefits. The Nordic 
countries have industrial relations characterized by close cooperation between 
the main partners in the labor market. This cooperation has kept industrial 
conflicts and inflation at bay. At the same time, it stimulated investments and 
productivity. Economic inequalities are among the lowest in the world. Inter-
personal trust is widespread, and the political institutions enjoy fairly high 
levels of citizen trust. Norway in particular has received much international 
credit for its economic policy. By a prudent use of oil revenues Norway has 
avoided the “curse of plenty” that has been detrimental to many other oil pro-
ducing countries. Moreover, the success of the Scandinavian model is not a 
recent phenomenon. According to Barth, Moene and Willumsen (2014), both 
Norway and Sweden have after 1982 experienced higher economic growth 
rates than the US. 
To a large extent the Norwegian version of the Nordic welfare state model 
rests on an elite consensus grown out of previous class compromises and com-
promises between opposing interest groups. Both the state and various popular 
movements, particularly the labor movement, have been important partners to 
these compromises. The compromises were forged between the leaders of the 
various class and interest organizations or movements. In that sense these com-
promises were elite compromises, in line with the theory of Field and Higley 
(1980) and Higley and Burton (2006), and they were examples of elite accom-
modation as discussed by Lijphart (1969a, 1969b) and Presthus (1973). 
The elite compromises in Norway have a two-tier structure (Engelstad, 
Gulbrandsen and Østerud 1999; Gulbrandsen et al. 2002). According to Higley 
and his collaborators, first-order elite compromises are those historic settle-
ments which establish a basic consensual unity among the main elites. They 
frequently lay down the constitutional structure in a society. Second-order 
compromises are sector specific agreements.  
A basic elite compromise in the history of the Norwegian nation was the lib-
eral Constitution of 1814, one of the most democratic at that time. This consti-
tution established individual rights which have formed the political landscape 
ever since. For instance, the fathers of the constitution attached the right to vote 
to ownership of property, implying that also independent farmers and even 
leaseholders in the countryside were granted the right to vote (Myhre 2018). 
This meant that the numerical backbone of society, the peasants, among them 
even the tiniest smallholder, had a say in national political matters. According 
to Kuhnle: “More than elsewhere in Europe peasants were carriers of freedom 
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and equality in Scandinavia” (2000, 209). This social group should later in the 
century become a significant political force in the Norwegian society. Similar-
ly, the Constitution gave citizens freedom of speech. A couple of decades later 
this freedom was an important precondition for a massive upsurge of voluntary 
associations. Many of these associations later developed into national popular 
movements with considerable political influence. 
Since the late 19th century we can identify at least three more first-order 
elite settlements in Norway that were important as preconditions for the emer-
gence and development of the Norwegian welfare state model. In 1884 a par-
liamentary system of government was introduced. This reform also entailed 
constitutional recognition and legitimation of conflicts between political par-
ties. The reform was pushed forward by a coalition of peasants, representatives 
of popular movements, and urban intellectuals. These groups founded the Lib-
eral Party (Venstre). The Liberal Party was formed in 1884 in opposition to the 
ruling elite of senior civil servants and urban burghers. Representatives of the 
latter groups established the Conservative party (Høyre) also in 1884. Three 
years later – in 1887 – the Labor Party was formed. The basic elite compromise 
behind the institutionalization of a parliamentary system thus gave rise to new 
ways of channeling political demands from below into the political system. 
The next decisive elite settlement was made around 1905 when Norway ac-
quired national independence from Sweden. Most Norwegian elites worked 
together to achieve national independence. And during the first years of inde-
pendence political discussions were tuned down in favor of the national project 
of building up the new nation. The last basic elite compromise in Norwegian 
history appeared in 1945. At the end of the Second World War the various 
Norwegian elite groups were firmly determined to work together for national 
reconstruction. This elite settlement manifested itself in a joint political pro-
gram formulated and endorsed by all the main political parties in Norway. 
In addition, consensual unity and political stability in Norway has been se-
cured through a number of sector-specific elite compromises. In this paper I 
will particularly focus upon the compromises behind two of the most promi-
nent elements of the Nordic model: (1) the welfare state and (2) the extensive 
collaboration between the trade union movement and employers’ associations. 
What may explain these elite compromises? How were they related to the more 
basic first-order elite settlements? Will the national elite compromises behind 
the Norwegian version of the Nordic model be upheld? Will the elites continue 
to endorse the generous welfare state and peaceful industrial relations? Have 
the challenges confronting Norwegian society during the last decade affected 
the elites’ willingness to support the Norwegian model?  
These questions will be discussed with reference to Norwegian historical 
studies and by using data from two survey studies of elites in Norway. The first 
one was conducted in 2000 and the second in 2015.  
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2. The Nordic Model and the Norwegian Version of the 
Model 
The idea that the Nordic countries make up a special group of democratic, 
welfare-capitalist countries is widely accepted. In his well-known analysis of 
welfare capitalism Esping-Andersen (1990) identified three types of welfare 
states: (i) social democratic, (ii) conservative, and (iii) liberal. The Nordic 
countries were analyzed as the proto-typical examples of social democratic 
welfare states. In the “varieties of capitalism” literature (Hall and Soskice 
2001) the Nordic countries have been denoted as a variant of “coordinated 
market economies” as opposed to “liberal market economies.”  
What are the main elements of this Nordic model? There is no consensus in 
the literature on the exact nature or content of a Nordic model. Moreover, each 
of the Nordic countries has its unique economic and social system. Nonethe-
less, the Nordic countries share a specific combination of institutions and poli-
cies, that justifies to consider them as a distinct category of democratic welfare 
states.  
2.1  Welfare State and Welfare Policies 
According to welfare state researchers (Christiansen et al. 2006; Kvist et al. 
2011; Pedersen and Kuhnle 2017) the Nordic welfare state model is character-
ized by comprehensive public responsibility for the welfare and well-being of 
citizens and residents, a large public sector and comparatively generous welfare 
benefits. A key characteristic of the Nordic welfare states is the principle of 
universal social rights for the entire population or at least sizeable categories of 
the population.  
The Nordic welfare state model clearly differs from the liberal welfare model 
that is prevalent in the USA and some of the other Anglo-Saxon countries. 
Liberal welfare states function to a large extent as market-based insurance 
systems in which benefits depend upon how much the individuals have paid. 
The Nordic model also differs from a continental model which is for instance 
practiced in Germany and France. In the continental model benefits are based 
on participation in the labor market and primarily financed through payments 
from employers and employees.  
The precursors of the modern welfare state were introduced at the end of the 
19th and the beginning of the 20th century (Seip 1984). In 1894 the first acci-
dent insurance law for workers in factories was passed. The first health insur-
ance act in Norway was passed in 1909. It implied a mandatory insurance of all 
workers with an income under a specified level. As in several other European 
countries, these first “welfare laws” emerged in response to a growing concern 
about the extent and consequences of poverty in Norway. These concerns were 
propounded by workers and their organizations, professionals such as doctors 
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and priests, and by many members of the civil service elite, mostly lawyers, 
who – motivated by humanitarian values – were particularly involved in social 
policy issues (Seip 1984; Slagstad 1998). The concerns and interests of these 
diverse groups were picked up by the three political parties that were formed 
during the 1880s. It was the Labor Party which first and foremost formulated 
the demands for new social policy issues (Seip 1984). The Liberal Party, the 
dominating party at that time, picked up the demands and reformulated them in 
order to reduce budgetary pressures. The first welfare laws can thus be seen as 
outcomes of compromises between the elites of the Liberal Party and The 
Labor Party.  
Successive extensions of the suffrage leading to a general suffrage for men 
in 1898 and women in 1913 implied that the political parties had to pay atten-
tion to new groups of voters. Social policies were particularly important for 
many of these new voters. Accordingly, social policy issues came to play a 
significant role as markers in the political discussions and between the political 
parties around the turn of the century.  
However, the Norwegian welfare state as we know it today was established 
only after World War II. Universal family allowance, continued payment of 
wages during sick leave, health insurance, unemployment benefits, and old-age 
pensions were introduced in quick succession and combined in a National 
Insurance Act that was passed in 1967. There was broad political consensus 
across the different political parties behind the various welfare measures. 
Several scholars have seen the spirit of solidarity caused by the war experiences 
and the ensuing national determination to reconstruct Norwegian society as 
important factors in explaining the broad political consensus behind these modern 
welfare policies (Hatland, Kuhnle and Romøren 2013). However, consensus 
was probably also obtained and potential conflicts avoided due to the continual 
economic growth that took place in the decades after the war.  
2.2  Collaborative Industrial Relations 
Scholars within the industrial relations tradition focus more on the unique 
collaboration between a strong trade union movement, centralized employers’ 
associations, and the state as the main element of the Nordic model (Falkum 
2016). The essence of this cooperation is a particular system of wage determi-
nation. The Nordic countries are characterized by small wage differentials 
(OECD 2015). The compressed wage structure is a result firstly of centralized 
wage negotiations combined with an extensive coordination of wage determi-
nation across different sectors. Secondly, the goal of compressed wages was 
adopted in the 1950s by the trade union movement both in Norway and Sweden 
under the slogan “Solidarity Wage Policy.” Even if the trade unions always 
have been distinguished by ideals of equality, the centralized wage determina-
tion was originally not based upon a wish to influence the income distribution 
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of the Nordic societies. As discussed by Moene and Wallerstein (1995), the 
original reasoning was primarily based on efficiency considerations. At the 
beginning of the 1950s, two Swedish trade union economists – Gösta Rehn 
(1952) and Rudolf Meidner (1952) – advocated wage equalization across en-
terprises and industries based on the assumption that this would stimulate eco-
nomic development, thereby allowing a faster restructuring of production by 
adopting new and more effective technologies. They argued that a compression 
of wages would push up wages in enterprises with low productivity and bring 
them down in highly productive companies. The result would be a faster re-
placement of less productive businesses by new and more modern ones. The 
consequence of centralized wage negotiations and a solidarity wage policy is 
thus a process of “creative destruction” (Barth, Moene and Willumsen 2014).  
A third significant element in the Norwegian system of wage determination 
is that internationally competitive industries negotiate first, establishing a norm 
for the rest of the wage settlements in the economy (Aukrust 1977). The inten-
tion is to ensure that wage growth in the economy is not higher than the indus-
tries exposed to international competition can sustain. This way of organizing 
the wage negotiations is based on the acknowledgment that Norway is a small 
economy and that her prosperity depends on the competitiveness of her indus-
tries (Katzenstein 1985).  
The collaboration between the major organizations in the labor market is not 
limited to wage determination. It also includes measures for improving the 
work environment and the introduction of new technologies and new forms of 
work. The cooperation rests on an extensive participation by both employees 
and employers. About 52 per cent of all employees in Norway are members of 
a trade union, and 67 per cent of all employees in Norway work in an enterprise 
that is member of an employer organization (Stokke, Nergaard and Evju 2013).  
This cooperation dates back to the beginning of the 20th century when em-
ployers and union leaders realized that strong international competition forced 
them to enter into moderate wage settlements. During the 1930s employers 
were eager to introduce a centralization of wage negotiations expecting it to 
lead to more moderate wage claims from the leaders of the national unions. By 
this, they hoped to undermine the power of militant leaders of local unions 
(Bowman 2002). After the war it became more important to leaders of both the 
Confederation of Employers and the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Un-
ions to use centralized wage settlements to ensure the competitiveness of the 
open Norwegian economy.  
In Norway the collaboration was first institutionalized through the Basic 
Agreement of 1935 between the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions 
(LO) and the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprises (NHO). The basic 
agreement was concluded between the top leaders in the two organizations and 
is thus an example of the kind of second-order elite compromises discussed 
above. The Basic Agreement regulates conflicts in the work place, the rights 
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and responsibilities of shop stewards and local unions, and the procedures in 
connection with significant changes of the enterprises. These “self-regulations” 
are complemented by various public regulations of the working conditions.  
Over the last decades, the cooperation has considerably reduced the scope of 
industrial conflict, prevented uncontrolled wage growth and stimulated produc-
tivity and the restructuring of enterprises. Both employers and employees agree 
that the system of industrial relations has been beneficial for the Norwegian 
economy (Barth, Moene and Willumsen 2014).  
2.3  Institutional Complementarities in the Norwegian Model 
As Dølvik, Fløtten, Hippe and Jordfald (2015) have emphasized, a unique 
quality of the Nordic model is that the various policies and institutions ‘interact.’ 
Or in line with the theories of Hall and Soskice (2001), there are considerable 
‘institutional complementarities’ between the various elements of the model. 
Firstly, the generous welfare provisions constitute an elaborate social safety net 
that protects individuals who lose their jobs during periods of recession and/or 
substantial restructuring. This safety net makes it less risky for employees and 
unions to take an active part in management decisions to increase productivity 
or to adjust the production to changes in demand. Moreover, in all Nordic 
countries public authorities invest heavily in education and training to facilitate 
a high mobility of the work force. During recessions it has for instance been 
common in Norway to scale up the number of students in institutions of higher 
education in order to prevent unemployment among young people. 
As already Katzenstein (1985, 24) observed a couple of decades ago:  
[E]lites in the small European states [TG: including Norway], while letting in-
ternational markets force economic adjustments, choose a variety of economic 
and social policies that prevent the costs of change from causing political 
eruptions. They live with change by compensating for it.  
2.4  Nordic Differences 
The Norwegian version of the Nordic model differs from those of the other 
Nordic countries in several respects. Firstly, on several occasions national 
collective bargaining in Norway has involved the state, while the Swedish state 
is rarely ever engaged in national wage negotiations. Secondly, in Norway 
unemployment benefits are administered by public authorities. In Sweden and 
Denmark, such benefits are administered by unemployment insurance funds, 
separate organizations which are, to a large extent, related to the labour unions. 
Thirdly, in spite of an increasing privatization of public companies and ser-
vices, the private welfare sector in Norway is small. In contrast, the conserva-
tive government that ruled Sweden in the period from 2006 to 2014 empha-
sized a privatization of welfare services. As a result, the private welfare sector 
in Sweden is significantly larger than in Norway and the other Nordic coun-
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tries. Fourthly, Norway is characterized by active policies to preserve a widely 
scattered spatial distribution of the population, a result of the strong position of 
peasants in Norway mentioned above. Substantial economic transfers to rural 
areas are a significant element of these policies. In contrast, Sweden has no 
similar policies for rural areas. As described above, the historical tensions 
between rural movements and their elites on one side and the urban elites on 
the other side, a center- periphery conflict – urban centers vs. rural areas – has 
been an important cleavage in Norwegian politics. This historical cleavage 
became evident when Norwegian voters in national referendums in 1972 and 
1994 turned down government proposals to join the European Union. On both 
occasions a pro-EU center and the anti-EU periphery represented the two sides 
of the conflict. 
2.5  Changes in the Model 
Two decades ago, Pierson (1996) observed that – in spite of considerable pres-
sures – the resilience of the welfare states was surprising. He suggested that 
this stemmed from the generally conservative characteristics of democratic 
political institutions. In contrast, Hemerijc (2013) has recently shown that 
many welfare states have introduced a number of qualitative changes especially 
in macro-economic policy, labor market policy, industrial relations, old age 
pensions, and social policies. 
In line with Hemerijc’s observations (2013), the Nordic model has not been 
static either. There are three major types of change: (1) Consolidating changes: 
One important example of such change was an income policy introduced in 
Norway in 1992, called the “Solidarity alternative” (NOU 1992, 26). The intro-
duction of the “Solidarity alternative” implied that all parties joined a macro-
economic understanding that costs and prices as well as real wages are best 
served by moderate wage settlements. In addition to an agreement about wage 
moderation the “Solidarity alternative” included a combination of moderate 
wage subsidies, employment-creating measures, simplification of public regu-
lations, training measures for working life, and stabilization of Norwegian 
currency. This income policy has since contributed to a stable economic devel-
opment in Norway.  
Another example is a budgetary rule concerning the usage of capital gains 
from “The Government Pension Fund – Global of Norway” which was intro-
duced in 2001, popularly called “The oil fund.” The purpose of the rule is to 
ensure that the sovereign wealth fund, predominantly consisting of oil reve-
nues, will secure continued economic development for future generations. The 
budgetary rule is supposed to continue yielding surpluses even after the petro-
leum resources of the North Sea are exhausted. The rule states that a maximum 
of 4% of the fund’s stock will be allocated to the annual government budget. 
This budgetary rule represents an institutionalization of a macro-economic 
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assumption that a balanced economic development requires that public authori-
ties avoid overheating of the economy by overly expansionist fiscal policies.  
Both institutional innovations are testimonies of the significant influence of 
Norwegian economists on political thinking in Norway. 
(2) Adjusting changes: In order to adjust their old age pension systems to the 
demographics of an ageing population, all Nordic countries have enacted pen-
sion reforms in order to improve the long-term financial sustainability of the 
systems. The Swedish reform is the most radical in this respect – transforming 
the Swedish pension system from one of the most generous among the OECD-
countries to one of the most meagre (Pedersen and Finseraas 2009). The Nor-
wegian pension reform was passed after two broad settlements. The details of 
the system were worked out within a small circle of top leaders from the Cabi-
net, the Labour Party and the Federation of Trade Unions (Grødem and Hippe 
2018). This policy change illustrates that there is no soft-headedness or concern 
for democratic participation when the ruling elite in Norway considers it neces-
sary to take political action.  
Another adjustment has been an increasing emphasis on “activation” and in-
centives to motivate and qualify the unemployed and disabled to work in the 
regular labor market. This approach is similar to earlier plans to change welfare 
to workfare. Similarly, the present government has introduced a mandatory 
duty to participate in qualifying and work preparing activities as condition for 
receiving social assistance (Langford 2017).  
(3) Structural changes in the economy with the potential to undermine the 
Norwegian model in the long run. Future growth in employment will primarily 
take place in private services. Because union membership is less common in 
these industries, trade union density in Norway is expected to decline. Such a 
development may undermine the power of the labor unions. Several scholars 
see strong and influential trade unions as a significant factor behind the emer-
gence and resilience of the Nordic model (Korpi 1981). A lower degree of 
unionization in the Norwegian economy may tempt groups of employers to 
reduce their participation in the national system of industrial relations. Moreo-
ver, an increasing number of labor migrants (mostly from Eastern Europe) and 
refugees put pressure both on national wage levels and union density, thereby 
also challenging the position of the labor unions in the Norwegian society.1 
                                                             
1  As in several other European countries, immigration has become a significant and heated 
political issue. The Progress Party, a right wing populist party, has grown to be the third 
largest party in Norway, first and foremost based upon their strong opposition to immigra-
tion, particular from the third world. 
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2.6  The Political Implementation of the Norwegian Model 
The preceding discussion has identified some pivotal causes behind the Nor-
wegian model. First of all, since the burgeoning of the welfare state a strong 
labor movement has been an important initiator of welfare policies. It has also 
been party to elite compromises on significant elements of the Norwegian 
model such as the Basic Agreement in 1935. At crucial moments in Norwegian 
history, the labor movement and the Labor Party were able to join forces with 
and receive support for its initiatives from other political groups in society. At 
the turn of the 20th century, the interests of workers were supported by the 
Liberal Party, which otherwise represented peasants and some popular move-
ments like the “New Norwegian Language” movement, the temperance move-
ment and the lay church movement. Later the Labor Party could climb to gov-
ernmental power after a historic settlement, again supported by the political 
representation of the peasants – now the Farmers’ Party. This happened in 
1935, after several years of economic crisis and high unemployment. At several 
occasions initiatives for welfare reforms also received support from representa-
tives of powerful elite groups. At the turn of the 20th century, civil service 
elites supported welfare reforms for humanitarian reasons. Likewise, business 
leaders endorsed the introduction of the Norwegian system of wage determina-
tion after World War II.   
The support for welfare policies from important segments of the civil ser-
vice elite is a testimony to the significance of national values, or mentalities, as 
prerequisites for the emergence of the Norwegian model. The prevailing phi-
losophy of the civil service elite contained a vision of the common weal. They 
believed that it was the obligation of the state to promote general welfare 
through economic growth (Myhre 2018; Slagstad 1998). A significant element 
of the strategy for achieving this was the development of a public educational 
system for all citizens. Inspired by German theories, leading Norwegian civil 
servants – who were mostly jurists – emphasized that the state is not only sup-
posed to be based on the rule of law but should also be a “Kulturstaat.” This 
“civilized state” should be “a strong arm” protecting the weak (Seip 1984). At 
the end of the 19th century, both social liberal and conservative politicians 
adopted these ideas. These historical observations are in line with Vivien A. 
Schmidt’s “discursive Institutionalism” (Schmidt 2008) underlining the im-
portant role of ideas, cognitive as well as normative ones, in political discourse.  
The formation of the Norwegian model was also facilitated by important in-
stitutional and structural conditions. As mentioned above, the Constitution of 
1814 established individual rights which laid the foundation of the ensuing 
political mobilization of broad segments of the Norwegian population. The 
institutionalization of a parliamentary system and a party system in 1884 
opened up channels for bringing demands into the political system from the 
popular movements that arose from that mobilization. The extension of voting 
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rights gave power to groups and parties that particularly promoted these de-
mands and paved the way for alliances between them. 
The situation of Norway as a small economy that is strongly exposed to in-
ternational competition has represented a structural condition for collaboration 
across class divides. As Katzenstein (1985) observed, the economical vulnera-
bility of small nations in Western Europe, including Norway, Denmark, and 
Sweden, led to what he called “democratic corporatism,” a mixture of ideologi-
cal consensus, centralized politics, and complex bargaining among politicians, 
interest groups, and bureaucrats. 
At the end of the 20th century a broad cooperation was also stimulated by 
the emergence of the new oil industry. At the outset uncertainty about the po-
tential of the continental shelf and a “wait and see” attitude led to a preference 
for foreign oil companies. The first major oil discovery in 1969 persuaded 
Norwegian politicians to start what has been called a “Norwegianization” of 
the oil industry. A state-owned oil company was soon established and given an 
ever stronger role in the extraction of oil. Moreover, an increasing number of 
assignments in the oil industry were given to national industries. This “eco-
nomic nationalism” was supported by all political parties as well as by employ-
ers and trade unions (Sejersted 1999).  
3. Continued Elite Support for the Norwegian Model? 
A national elite survey, which was carried out in Norway in 2000, indicated that 
the majority of Norwegian elites supported the basic institutions and policies of 
the Norwegian version of the Nordic welfare state model and the political com-
promises upon which they are based (Gulbrandsen et al. 2002). They expressed 
strong support for the system of centralized wage settlements, a main element in 
the industrial relations system. They rallied behind continued economic transfers 
to the regions. A majority of the elite groups preferred to uphold the state as the 
main provider and distributor of welfare services and to continue policies for a 
reduction of income differences. 
In the following, I will attempt to examine whether Norwegian elites continue 
to support this model. For this purpose I will use data from the Norwegian Lead-
ership Studies 2000 and 2015 (see more below). As demonstrated above, the 
Nordic model is complex and includes many interrelated elements, so it is diffi-
cult to provide a comprehensive account of all of its facets. Therefore, the follow-
ing analysis will focus on elite support for two of the main pillars of the model: 
(1) an active and at the same time extensive welfare state and (2) the cooperative 
system of industrial relations.  
The dramatic international events that have taken place during the latest fif-
teen years may have affected elite support for the Norwegian model in various 
ways. On the one hand, both the financial and the EU crisis, problems associated 
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with climate change and immigration may have caused the Norwegian elites to 
doubt the ability of the Norwegian model to ward off negative consequences for 
their country. Moreover, during the first years of the new millennium it seemed 
as if neo-liberal ideas had increased the reluctance of some national leaders, 
particular those in the private business sector, to continue their endorsement of 
this model. Belief in the merits of market mechanisms took hold even in parts of 
the public sector. As a result, ever more public services have been exposed to 
competition from private suppliers. Moreover, market-like mechanisms of gov-
ernance were introduced in public institutions. These changes may have contrib-
uted to a decline in support for the Norwegian model among influential elites.  
On the other hand, the same international events may rather have moved elites 
of all sectors to rally around the Norwegian political institutions. In spite of the 
many international challenges, the Norwegian society and the Norwegian econ-
omy have fared quite well. The favorable development may have strengthened 
elites’ interest in solutions provided by the Nordic model, with coordinated bar-
gaining and generous welfare states. 
Moreover, as indicated above, there are aspects of Norwegian society which 
will probably contribute to uphold the main elements of the Norwegian model. 
Structurally, the Norwegian economy is still, and perhaps even more, exposed to 
intense international competition. Exports and imports make up about 50 percent 
of GDP. This situation implies, in line with Katzenstein’s (1985) analysis, an 
economic vulnerability which can be expected to motivate elites to continue to 
maintain the “democratic corporatism” he observed some decades ago. There-
fore, it is likely that the elites of capital and labor will continue to endorse the 
cooperative industrial relations. Accordingly, it can be expected that the analysis 
will show continued elite support for this cooperation.   
Another structural precondition for the resilience of the Norwegian welfare 
state is the exceptionally favorable economic situation. The oil revenues give 
ample opportunities to retain various welfare programs and to fulfill budgetary 
promises. This economic freedom of action can explain why significant welfare 
policies and programs still receive broad support in Norwegian society, even 
among elites that usually tend to be skeptical of a large public sector. Against this 
background, I expect to find that broad welfare programs are generally endorsed 
by the Norwegian elites.  
Moreover, the Norwegian welfare state model rests on an egalitarian culture, 
which is expressed by widespread preferences for economic equality (Aalberg 
1998; Myhre 2018). Admittedly, in the last decades this culture has been chal-
lenged by a more self-conscious upper class and by a government which has 
introduced tax reductions that primarily have benefited wealthy people. Nonethe-
less, the value of equality still looms large in Norwegian culture. However, there 
is not the same consensus on the role of the state as an executor of necessary 
policies to achieve this goal. For instance, public ownership of business and 
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progressive taxation is less popular in Norway than in many other Western coun-
tries (Aalberg 1998).  
The disagreement regarding effective policies to achieve higher equality is an 
expression of the main cleavage in Norwegian politics – the role and scope of the 
state (Rokkan 1987; Aardal 2003). Closely related with this issue is the extent of 
economic redistribution through taxes and an income policy based on solidarity. 
The two largest political parties in Norway – the Conservative Party and the 
Labor Party represent the two sides of this private-public cleavage or left-right 
cleavage. Elites’ attitudes towards various aspects of the Norwegian welfare state 
model are probably related to how they position themselves along this basic 
political divide. Therefore, it can be expected that Norwegian elites will diverge 
in their opinions about a large and active state as the main provider of social 
services.  
4. Data and Method 
The Leadership Study 2000 was a survey of a net sample of 1710 Norwegian 
top leaders within ten sectors of the Norwegian society: (1) Politics (members 
of parliament, state secretaries, mayors of the largest municipalities), (2) civil 
service, (3) culture, (4) mass media, (5) business sector, including some corpo-
rations with shared government/private ownership, (6) civic/voluntary organi-
zations, including business organizations and trade unions, (7) universities and 
large research institutes, (8) police and courts of justice, (9) military services, 
and (10) the church. This study was an important part of the Power and De-
mocracy Project, a five year project commissioned by the Norwegian parlia-
ment. The Leadership Study was conducted by the Institute for Social Re-
search, Oslo, in collaboration with Statistics Norway. The response rate of the 
survey was 87%. The purpose of the Leadership Study 2000 was to examine 
the social backgrounds and careers of Norwegian top leaders, their relation-
ships with each other, their attitudes on key policy issues, their lobbying activi-
ties, etc.  
In 2015, a second survey of Norwegian elites was carried out, The Norwe-
gian Leadership Study 2015, which was again organized by the Institute for 
Social Research and Statistics Norway. This time the net sample consisted of 
1352 top leaders from the same sectors as in the first study and with a response 
rate of 71.5%. To some extent the second study was a replication of the Lead-
ership Study 2000 and included the same core questions. These two surveys 
enable us to chart to what extent various elite groups in Norway continue to 
endorse the main elements of the Norwegian welfare state model and whether 
their opinions have changed since 2000. Moreover, it will be possible to distin-
guish issues where elites diverge and where tensions between elites can be 
expected to precede institutional changes. The data will also permit the identi-
HSR 43 (2018) 4  │  126 
fication of what may be called “change agents,” i.e. powerful elite groups or 
individuals expressing demands to change significant elements of the model. 
The percentage of respondents within each elite group who disagreed with 
the statement: “In Norway we have come far enough as to the reduction of 
economic inequalities” was used to measure the elites’ endorsement of egalitar-
ian values. 
The top leaders’ support for concrete welfare policies was measured by ask-
ing them to indicate whether public authorities should spend more, the same as 
today, or less on the following welfare areas: (1) Health care, (2) education,  
(3) child care, (4) parental and maternity leave, (5) labor market measures, and 
(6) social assistance. 
As a measure of the elites’ attitudes towards public versus private solutions 
an index was constructed that was based on the average of the respondents’ 
scores for the following three statements: (a) “It is more important to extend 
public services than to reduce taxes”; (b) “In Norway one should put stronger 
emphasis upon privatization and a smaller public sector”; (c) “State influence 
on private business should be reduced.” The leaders were given four response 
alternatives: (i) Strongly agree, (ii) agree somewhat, (iii) disagree somewhat, 
(iv) strongly disagree. The coding for item (a) had to be reversed since it was 
phrased in the opposite direction. The items in the 2000 study had a range of 
values from 1 to 4. A score of 4 indicated that the leaders fully backed the 
public sector and an extension of public services, while a score of 1 indicated 
that the leaders favored a smaller public sector, more privatization, and a cur-
tailing of the state’s power over private business. In the 2015 study, the state-
ments were presented with five response alternatives and accordingly the index 
had a range of scores from 1 to 5. A score of 5 indicated support for an active 
and intervening state, while a score of 1 denoted that the respondents preferred 
more privatization and less extensive public services. To enable comparisons of 
the elite responses in the two years, the 2000 index was converted into one with 
scores from 1 to 5. This was done by dividing the 2000 values by four and 
multiplying them by five. 
Finally, the elites’ attitudes towards the collaborative system of industrial re-
lations in Norway were determined by first asking them to locate their personal 
preferences on a 0 to 10 point scale where a value of 0 denotes that they con-
sidered the benefit of collaboration between employers, unions, and the state as 
being very low, while a value of 10 signifies that it is very high. Secondly, they 
were asked to state whether they agreed or disagreed with the following state-
ment: “In your opinion, how important is it to Norway to continue the central-
ized wage settlements in the years to come?”  
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5.  Results 
Some historians see widespread support in the Norwegian population for social 
equality as an important basis for the emergence of the welfare state (Myhre 
2018). This support is captured in the title of a well-known book about the 
Nordic countries published three decades ago – “Norden: A passion for equali-
ty” (Graubard 1986). Scholars have documented that Norwegians more than 
citizens in most other countries want society to be characterized by an even 
distribution with relatively small economic differences (Aalberg 1998). More-
over, laboratory experiments have demonstrated that Norwegians are less will-
ing than for instance Americans to accept inequality based on luck (Almås, 
Cappelen and Tungodden 2016). The widespread egalitarian values indicate 
support for policies aiming at a reduction of economic inequalities. As a result 
of such policies, income differences in the Nordic countries are relatively 
small. For instance, in 2013 Sweden and Norway had the smallest pay differen-
tials among all OECD-countries (OECD 2015).  
But is a reduction of economic inequalities also supported by the elites? Figure 
1 shows the percentage of respondents within each elite group who disagree 
that Norway has done enough to reduce economic differences. Figure 1 demon-
strates that in 2000 a majority of the respondents in all elite groups, except for 
the private business elite, advocated a continuation of policies for reducing 
economic disparities. In 2015 the percentages in favor of reducing economic 
inequalities were lower in all elite groups. This change may to some extent be a 
result of the different response alternatives in the questions in the 2000 and 
2015 studies. In 2015 the respondents were given the option to answer “neither 
– nor”, while in 2000 they had to choose either confirming or negating re-
sponse alternatives. This difference in response options may have reduced the 
percentages in favor of a continued reduction of economic disparities. On the 
other hand, some of the decline in support of equalizing policies is probably 
real. Nonetheless, there were still majorities within most elite groups who 
disagreed that enough has been done to reduce economic differences. Within 
the business sector (including some corporations in which ownership is shared 
by government and private owners), there was even a small increase in the 
percentage of members who supported this opinion.  
As Figure 2 shows, attitudes towards reducing economic differences are po-
larized within the political elite. Both in 2000 and 2015 politicians belonging to 
the Socialist Left Party, the Labor Party, and the Centre Party were strongly in 
favor of continued efforts to reduce economic inequalities. In contrast, among 
politicians of the Conservative Party and the Progress Party clear majorities 
believe that enough has been done already. In other words, the attitudes of the 
politicians follow the left-right continuum. The private business elite, and to 
some extent the military elite join the Conservative party and the Progress party 
in a resistance to more economic leveling.  
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Figure 1:  Elite Attitudes towards Reducing Economic Differences,  
Average Percentages in Favor of Continued Reduction 
 
Source: The Norwegian Leadership Studies 2000 and 2015. 
 
Has this lack of elite consensus led to a faltering elite support of concrete welfare 
programs? The findings presented in Figure 3 indicate that the answer is “no.” 
Figure 3 presents the elites’ attitudes in 2015 towards various welfare pro-
grams. It shows the percentages within each elite group who opted for an in-
crease in 2015. It also confirms that there is broad elite support for increasing 
the grants for major welfare programs such as education and health care. 
Moreover, a further analysis (not presented here) demonstrates that for those 
programs for which the elites are hesitant to increase public budgets, e.g. social 
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Figure 2:  Politicians’ Attitudes towards Reducing Economic Differences, 
Average Percentages in Favor of Continued Reduction 
 
Source: The Norwegian Leadership Studies 2000 and 2015. 
 
Above, I discussed how the emergence of the modern welfare state in Norway 
built on extensive elite consensus. The findings presented in Figure 3 indicate 
that there still is a widespread elite consensus about keeping up the main wel-
fare programs. This implies that the financial crisis has not affected the elites’ 
dedication to maintain the generous and universalistic Norwegian welfare state. 
Of course, the favorable economic situation of Norway, caused by the high oil 
revenues, has made it easy for the elites to stand by this conviction. 
As mentioned before, one function of the social safety net is to provide help 
to those who lose their jobs due to the necessary structural adaptations in the 
Norwegian economy. The continued support for labor market measures and 
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Figure 3:  Elite Attitudes towards Public Grants for Various Welfare Programs, 
Average Percentages in Favor of Larger Grants  
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Figure 4:  Politicians’ Views on Public Grants for Various Welfare Programs, 
Average Percentages in Favor of Larger Grants 
 
Source: The Norwegian Leadership Study 2015. 
 
Figure 4 provides the attitudes of the party politicians towards the various 
welfare programs. Support to increase or at least maintain the present levels of 
spending on education and health care is fairly high among them as well. Be-
yond these two programs, the results appear somewhat “messy,” however. On 
the one hand, there are disagreements between the parties along the left-right 
continuum. For instance, the two right-wing parties are less inclined than the 
Socialist Left Party and the Labor Party to expand labor market measures, 
social assistance, kindergartens, and maternity leave. This finding illustrates the 
significance of the left-right cleavage in Norwegian politics. On the other hand, 
responses seem to be related to the issues over which the political parties claim 
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party flag strong support for maternity leave, the politicians of the Centre Party 
express no intention to expand the existing program.  
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the continuation of a long tradition of elite consen-
sus about the desirability of maintaining a welfare society with programs also 
for the less privileged. As mentioned above, this elite consensus has historical-
ly not extended to an agreement about the role of the state as the main provider 
of welfare services and about the level of taxation to finance the services. The 
cleavage between those supporting public solutions and high taxation and those 
preferring more private solutions and lower taxation is central in Norwegian 
politics. Figure 5 shows the attitudes of Norwegian elites to private versus 
public solutions in 2000 and 2015.  
Figure 5:  Elite Support for Public versus Private Solutions,  
Average Scores on an Index from 1 to 5 
 
Source: The Norwegian Leadership Studies 2000 and 2015. 
 
Figure 5 demonstrates that the majority of the elite groups exhibited a moderate 
support for public solutions in 2000. Politicians, church leaders, leaders of 
culture, and top leaders within the academic sector emerged as the strongest 
supporters of the role and size of the public sector. Nonetheless, their backing 
for public solutions and a high level of taxation appeared to be moderate. Top 
leaders in the military service and private business leaders distinguished them-
selves by being in favor of more privatization and a decrease of taxation. Sen-
ior public officials, top leaders in the voluntary organizations, in the police and 
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centrist attitudes. Fifteen later, in 2015, the average scores had increased in 
nearly all elite groups. This result indicates an increase in support among Nor-
wegian elites for public solutions and for maintaining the present level of taxa-
tion. 
There are two notable changes. Politicians were somewhat less enthusiastic 
in 2015 than in 2000. The main reason for this change is that the composition 
of the members of the Storting (the Norwegian parliament) changed as a result 
of the parliamentary election of 2013. The election was won by political parties 
of the right. The other change is that members of the private business elite in 
2015 were less opposed to public solutions than in 2000. 
Above, I asked whether the financial crisis might have weakened elites’ 
support for the Norwegian welfare state model. Figure 5 indicates that their 
support for an active state had rather strengthened. The resolute intervention 
from Norwegian authorities to neutralize negative effects of the financial crisis 
may explain this. Already during a banking crisis in Norway at the beginning 
of the 1990s, the state acted tough-mindedly by letting even large banks go 
bankrupt and by assuming ownership of these banks. In the wake of that crisis, 
the Ministry of Finance tightened capital and liquidity requirements for the 
banks. When the financial crisis hit Norway in 2008, the government respond-
ed to increasing demand by reducing the interest rate from 5.75 to 1.25 per cent 
and by expanding the fiscal stimulus. These policies steered Norway success-
fully through the crisis. The financial crisis and the Norwegian response may 
have moved many top leaders to become more skeptical of an unfettered capi-
talism and more inclined to endorse the Norwegian model. An indication of 
this endorsement is that elite trust in the political institutions rose between 2000 
and 2015 (Gulbrandsen 2018). 
Figure 6 shows that the political parties both in 2000 and 2015 were more 
divided in their views on the role and scope of the state than the other elite 
groups. The Venstre Party is not included in the figure because only one repre-
sentative of that party participated in the 2015 survey. As expected politicians 
belonging to the Socialist People’s Party (SV), The Centre Party (Sp), and the 
Labor Party (Ap), favored public solutions, while members of the Conservative 
Party (Høyre) and the (right wing) Progress Party (FrP) stated clear prefer-
ences for more privatization. Therefore, the figures indicate that the Conserva-
tive Party and the Progress Party are the natural allies for the private business 
leaders in their resistance to state intervention and a large public sector.  
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Figure 6:  Politicians’ Support for Public vs. Private Solutions, 
 Average Scores on an Index from 1 to 5 
 
Source: The Norwegian Leadership Studies 2000 and 2015. 
 
Figure 7:  Elite Support for the Collaboration between Employers, Unions, and 
the State, Average Scores, Range 1 to 10 
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Figure 8:  Politicians’ Support for the Collaboration between Employers, Unions, 
and the State, 2015 Average scores, Range 1 to 10 
 
Source: The Norwegian Leadership Study 2015. 
 
How do the various elites consider the value of the collaboration between em-
ployers, unions, and the state for Norway? Figure 7 demonstrates a strong and 
almost unanimous approval of the Norwegian system of industrial relations in 
2015. All elite groups scored high on this issue and the inter-sectoral differ-
ences are small. Figure 8 shows that the support was strong among the politi-
cians of all parties. Only the Progress Party was less enthusiastic. Figure 9 
reveals that support for an important element of the Norwegian industrial rela-
tion systems – centralized income settlements – was similarly strong, both in 
2000 and 2015.  
These results imply that a significant pillar of the Norwegian model enjoys 
solid support in the Norwegian elite. There is widespread understanding in the 
Norwegian society regarding the benefits of the collaborative industrial rela-
tions. As Katzenstein (1985) has maintained, these industrial relations may be 
seen as a solution to the problem of economic vulnerability facing small coun-
tries exposed to strong international competition. Nonetheless, he found that 
the specific system of wage determination distinguishes the Nordic countries 
from the other small European countries. This system was an institutional in-
novation invented by Swedish economists and further developed by Norwegian 
economists. It is a testimony to the influential role of economists in the Nordic 
countries and to the adoption of their macro-economic orientation by employ-
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Figure 9:  Elite Support for Centralized Income Settlements,  
Average Percentages 
 
Source: The Norwegian Leadership Studies 2000 and 2015. 
6.  Discussion 
In general, there is (still) considerable support for the Norwegian welfare state 
model. This is manifested by the widespread backing of more or at least the 
same level of spending on various important welfare programs. Such support is 
also demonstrated by the extensive endorsement of the collaborative system of 
industrial relations. It is a testimony to a pervasive recognition of the benefits 
of this system, benefits that have been demonstrated by several leading Norwe-
gian economists. Moreover, the percentage of elites who are in favor of public 
solutions for important welfare policies, increased from 2000 to 2015 even 
among members of the business elite.  
Among the politicians the attitudes towards public solutions are closely re-
lated with the traditional left-right cleavage. The two right-wing parties – the 
Conservative Party and the Progress Party – favor more privatization and less 
taxation. But even within the Conservative Party there is a slight increase in the 
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It has frequently been claimed that egalitarian values have a good foothold 
in the Norwegian population. The analyses presented above indicate, however, 
that many elite members are more reserved as far as continued efforts to reduce 
economic disparities are concerned. Reservations are greatest within the busi-
ness and the military elite as well as among politicians belonging to the two 
right-wing parties.  
What may explain the stability of the Norwegian version of the Nordic 
model? There are well developed welfare states in other European countries. 
Other countries are exposed to the same international competition. Corporatism 
is found in other European countries as well. Strong Labor parties have been 
prevalent in several other countries. Is the stability nonetheless due to factors 
specific to Norwegian society? I suggest that it is primarily the specific combi-
nation of facilitating conditions rather than specific factors which can explain 
the resilience of the Norwegian model: A strong labor movement, a unique 
system of wage determination, institutional complementarity between this 
system and welfare state services and benefits, an influential profession of 
economists, a historically uncorrupt and efficient civil service, a strong rural 
counter-culture which is easily mobilized for “economic nationalism,” and 
widespread egalitarian values. 
But will the Norwegian model persist? In the two latest parliamentary elec-
tions in Norway the voters enabled the two right-wing parties in Norway to 
form a government, supported by two small center parties. As was demonstrated 
above, in the Norwegian Leadership Study of 2015, the politicians belonging to 
these two right-wing parties, supported by the private business elite, expressed 
skepticism with regard to significant elements of the “Norwegian model.” In 
line with their political attitudes, these parties initiated several political changes 
that in the longer run may undermine the model. The government has for in-
stance continued to leave the provision of public services like the building and 
maintenance of roads, nursing homes and kindergartens to private providers. 
Another example is that the government has – through changes in the Work 
Environment Act – expanded the time span for which employees may be em-
ployed on a temporary basis. This change has increased the number of employ-
ees with such contracts (Strøm, von Simson and Østbakken 2018). It is well 
known that such employees have a lower unionization rate. This policy may 
gradually weaken the power of the trade unions in Norway.  
However, the attitudes of these potential change agents are not necessarily 
consistent. A good example is the Progress Party. The Progress Party 
(Fremskrittspartiet) is a right-wing populist party which entered Norwegian 
politics in 1973 on a low-tax, anti-state-involvement platform. During the last 
decades it has supplemented its traditional platform with a strong resistance 
towards immigration. Nonetheless, it also exhibits a strong advocacy for using 
more “oil money” to the benefit of the sick and elderly. In other words, it is 
also a defender of several traditional welfare programs. 
HSR 43 (2018) 4  │  138 
Similarly, among many members of the business elite there is a common 
recognition of the intrinsic complementarity between industrial restructuring 
and welfare policies. There was also a wide perception and an appreciation 
within the business elite of the state’s resolute intervention to avoid negative 
effects of the international banking crisis. This was demonstrated in a separate 
analysis (not shown here) in which 52 per cent of the business leaders in the 
Leadership Study 2015 agreed that the financial industry needs to be subjected 
to more control. It is also noticeable that in the parliamentary election of 2014 
22 per cent of the top leaders in private business voted for the Labor Party, 
another indication of support for an active state. 
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